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Abstract
In this paper we analyze macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting policy in New Zealand
using Markov switching model with one time permanent break. Our results show that the
inflation targeting policy has significantly changed the inflation dynamics in the New
Zealand economy. The Markov switching model clearly detects a structural break date that is
very close to the actual date of the policy change. The volatility in the inflation rate shows a
considerable reduction after the structural break date. Our results also show that the inflation
targeting policy led to a structural change in real GDP growth rate. The policy change
significantly reduced the volatility of real GDP growth rate after the break date. We find that
there is a lag of about one year and six months between the monetary policy change and its
actual effect on output growth.
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In the 1990s, several countries introduced a policy that concentrates on stabilizing inflation rates, 
which is labeled inflation targeting policy. Inflation targeting is a monetary policy framework in 
which central banks set an inflation rate target, for example, 2% annual inflation rates for 2 
years, and make use of all available policy instruments to attain the goal.   
Inflation targeting policy has been adopted by a number of industrialized countries such 
as New Zealand (1990), Canada (1991), Israel (1991), U.K. (1992), Sweden (1993), Finland 
(1993), and Australia (1994).
1 Among G7 countries, the U.S., France, Germany, Japan, and Italy 
do not commit to an explicit inflation targeting policy. Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen 
(1999) show that all countries using inflation targeting significantly reduced both the rate of 
inflation and the volatility of key macroeconomic variables, and argue that inflation targeting 
would be a better choice for monetary policy in the U.S. In the literature, however, most research 
regarding inflation targeting utilizes a relatively less rigorous case-study approach rather than a 
rigorous econometric approach. It is the goal of this paper to analyze macroeconomic effects of 
inflation targeting policy in New Zealand using a more rigorous framework.  
New Zealand is an inflation targeting pioneer and the first country to adopt inflation 
targeting policy. New Zealand, which had experienced high and volatile inflation in the past, has 
been successful in bringing inflation in line with other OECD countries by adopting inflation 
targeting. To account for the dramatic effects of the adoption of inflation targeting in New 
Zealand, we employ traditional parameter stability tests and introduce the more rigorous 
framework of Markov switching structural break model. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the New Zealand economy before and 
after the adoption of the inflation targeting policy. Section 3 presents the traditional parameter 
stability testing results for the inflation rate using the Chow test, CUSUM and CUSUM square 
tests. Section 3 explains the Markov switching structural break model. Section 4 analyzes the 






New Zealand is a country with limited internal resources, thus a large appetite for international 
trade.  However, it has a short list of exports and a small number of trading partners.  This has 
led to a history of wide swings in the New Zealand economy with amplified responses to both 
internal and external shocks.  For example, while the oil price shocks of the 1970s sent the US 
into a recession with about 2% decline in output and Australia’s growth slowed to about 1%, 
New Zealand went into a 6% decline.   
In addition to exaggerated real output cycles, New Zealand has also experienced high 
volatility in its overall price level.  During the 1970s and early 1980s the country was subjected 
to inflation rates in the teens with peaks around 20%.  The use of wage and price controls was 
attempted three times during that period, resulting in even higher inflation once the controls were 
eased. The failure of these policies resulted in political pressure for monetary reform, reforms 
                                                           
1 The adoption of an inflation targeting policy in Australia was more gradual, and it is hard to determine the exact 
date of the adoption.  
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that materialized in the mid-1980s. By the first quarter of 1985 New Zealand had instituted 
financial liberalization, which included a free-floating NZ currency, disappearance of interest 
rate controls and reserve ratios, and the establishment of the independence of the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand [RBNZ]. Subsequently, the RBNZ Act of 1989 mandated that the sole 
responsibility of the central bank was to establish and maintain price stability.  Inflation targets 
are set via a Policy Targets Agreement [PTA] between the Reserve Bank and the government.  
The Governor of the Reserve Bank is personally responsible for achieving the inflation target 
and can be dismissed for target breaches. Although the targets have been violated several times 
since the signing of the first PTA in March 1990, the Governor
2 has been allowed to keep his job 
so far. 
According to RBNZ (2001), in the post-liberalization / pre-RBNZ Act of 1989 period, the 
central bank embraced the monetarist approach to attacking inflation.  They were concerned with 
controlling the monetary quantities and mostly ignored interest rates and exchange rates.   
Following a sharp drop in the exchange rate in late 1988, this focus gradually shifted from 
monetary aggregates to inflation targeting.  Official inflation targets did not emerge, however, 
until the first PTA was signed in 1990.   
The PTA inflation rate has been set as a range, usually about 0 to 3%. A fixed range is 
deemed more credible than a point or a floating range. Target transparency and operational 
transparency are also seen as helping monetary policy to be more credible and effective (see 
RBNZ (1999)). The inflation rate as measured by CPIX, consumer price index minus cost of 
credit, began subsiding in the late 1980s coinciding with the advent of reforms. The first PTA in 
1990 was set at 3 to 5%.   It was reduced to 0 to 2% in 1992.  Actual inflation, for the most part, 
followed the targeted path and hovered around 2% during the late 1990s
3. This has kept New 
Zealand’s inflation in line with the average among OECD countries in recent years.   
Former Governor Don Brash (RBNZ (1999)) credits the success of inflation targeting in 
stabilizing prices with reducing the volatility of New Zealand’s business cycle as well. Although 
New Zealand is still highly sensitive to economic shocks, growth since 1990 does indeed appear 
to be more stable than in the past. 
 
 
3. Parameter Stability Tests 
 
 
In order to investigate if the adoption of the inflation targeting policy has effectively stabilized 
the inflation rate of New Zealand and brought a change in the structure of the New Zealand 
economy, we use some traditional parameter stability testing procedures, i.e. the Chow test, 
CUSUM and CUSUM squares tests. We collect the data of GDP deflator for New Zealand from 
1997 OECD International Statistical Yearbook CD. The sample period is from the first quarter of 
1982 to the last quarter of 1996. We estimate the following AR(2) model for the inflation rate of 
New Zealand because the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz’s Information 
Criterion (SIC) suggest the series follows an autocorrelated process with two lags. This process 
takes the following form:  
  11 2 11 tt t t ππ πα π α πε +− + =+ +    (1) 
                                                           
2 Dr. Don Brash served as Governor until April 2002 when he left to run for political office.  The current Governor 
is Dr. Alan Bollard. 
3As of this writing the PTA is set at 1-3% with the last reported CPIX at 2.4%.   
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where  t π denotes quarterly inflation rate using GDP deflator.  
  We test for the existence of a structural change in the model before and after the first 
quarter of 1990 when the first PTA was signed. In Table 1, the Chow test results show that we 
should reject the null hypothesis of no structural change at the 1 % level.
4 The test statistic, 4.816, 
is distributed as  2,56 F  and the p-value is 0.005.   
 The CUSUM testing results are shown in Figure 1.
5 Figure 1 shows that the model of the 
inflation rate of New Zealand becomes unstable in the middle of the 1980s, which coincides with 
the beginning of financial reform. In Figure 2, the CUSUM square testing results show that the 
model became unstable between 1987 and 1992. It is known that CUSUM and CUSUM square 
tests can detect systematic and haphazard movements in parameters respectively.
6 Combining 
CUSUM and CUSUM square testing results, we conclude that the model is unstable both 
systematically and haphazardly before and after the adoption of inflation targeting policy. 
In sum, the Chow test and the CUSUM and CUSUM squares tests show that the 
parameters of the model are unstable over the sample period under consideration. 
 
 
4. Markov Switching Model  
 
 
Since traditional parameter stability tests do not provide enough information to analyze 
macroeconomic effects of the inflation targeting policy in New Zealand, we adopt a more 
sophisticated and general technique.  In the previous section we performed the Chow test under 
the assumption that the structural break happened in the first quarter of 1990. In practice, 
however, we do not know when the structural break occurred. In addition, traditional parameter 
stability tests cannot provide any information on the volatility reduction of the inflation rate. We 
can solve these problems using Markov switching model with one time permanent break. 
                                                           
4 The Chow test statistic is given as follows: 
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where uu ′    is the restricted sum of squared residuals and  ii uu ′ is the sum of squared residuals from sub-samplei , N 
is the total number of observations and k is the number of parameters in the equation. 
5 We examine parameter stability using the CUSUM test. This test is based on the cumulative sum of the recursive 
residuals and calculates the following statistic. 
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where wis the recursive residual defined above and s is the standard error of the regression fitted to all T sample 
points. We can find the parameter instability when the cumulative sum goes outside the area between the two critical 
lines.  
6 See Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975) for details.  
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Assuming an AR(2) process as in section 3, we adopt two-state Markov switching break model 
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where  t π is the inflation rate and  t D is a latent variable and modeled as a first order Markov 
process (two regimes) with transition probabilities given by:  
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where t D equals 0 before the structural break at time t τ = and  t D equals 1 after the structural 
break. 
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To estimate this model we derive the joint density of  t π ,  t D  and  1 t D − conditional on the past 
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Next we use equation (9) to get  1 (| ) tt f I π − as follows: 
 
                                                           
7 The model we use in this paper is similar to the one used by Kim, Nelson and Piger (2003). They use Bayesian 
Markov Switching model to tests a structural break at an unknown break date. They find that the structural break 
date of the U.S. real GDP volatility is 1984:1 and that it is shared by its cyclical component but not by its trend 
component. They also find that the volatility reduction occurs over broad sectors of real GDP. We, however, apply 
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where  [] [ ] [ ] 11 1 11 Pr , | Pr | Pr | tt t t t t t D j Di I D j DiDi I −− − −− ==== = = , for  ,0 , 1 . ij = We can 
compute the weight term, 11 Pr[ , | ] tt t D DI −−, in equation (11) by updating it, once  t π is observed at 
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== = = ∑   and iterate equation (11) and (12) for 
1, 2, , tT = … , we will have appropriate weighting terms in  1 (| ) . tt f I π −   (For more details, see 
Hamilton (1989) and Kim and Nelson (1999).) 
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
 
Table 2 summarizes the results. The estimated structural break date is the 4
th quarter of 1989, 
which is very close to when New Zealand officially adopted the inflation targeting policy in the 
first quarter of 1990, but even closer to the point where actual inflation targeting most likely 
began. Note that q = 0.965 and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, we 
conclude that the inflation targeting policy has significantly changed the inflation dynamics in 
the New Zealand economy. Next, the volatility in the inflation rate shows considerable reduction 
after the structural break date. Before adopting the inflation targeting policy, the volatility, for 
which we use the standard deviation, is almost three times larger than afterwards. Those two 
estimated standard deviations, 
0 D σ and
1 D σ , are statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
constant term also has undergone a large drop that affects the unconditional mean of the inflation 
rate. The unconditional mean decreased from 7.5 to 0.41.
8  The estimated AR parameters, 
however, are not statistically significant. Figure 3 plots the estimated probability of a structural 
                                                           















break at each point in time. It is easy to see that the unknown break date is very close to the date 
when New Zealand adopted the inflation targeting policy. 
  Figure 4 shows the effect of the inflation targeting policy on real GDP growth rate. In 
Figure 4 the volatility reduction can be clearly detected after the break date compared to before 
the break date. In Table 2 the structural break date of real GDP growth rate is found to be the 
third quarter of 1991, which means that there is a lag of about one year and six months between 







We find from section 5 that the inflation targeting policy has significantly changed the inflation 
dynamics in the New Zealand economy. The Markov switching model clearly detects a structural 
break date that is very close to the actual date of the policy change. The volatility in the inflation 
rate shows a considerable reduction after the structural break date. Before adopting the inflation 
targeting policy, the volatility of inflation rates is almost three times larger than afterwards. The 
constant term also decreases significantly after the break date.  
  Our results also show that the inflation targeting policy led to a structural change in real 
GDP growth rate. In fact the policy change significantly reduced the volatility of real GDP 
growth rate after the break date. The results also show that there is a lag of about one year and 
six months between the monetary policy change and its actual effect on output growth. 
  Overall, we can conclude that the inflation targeting policy adopted by New Zealand was 
successful in stabilizing the inflation and output growth rates of the New Zealand economy. 
However, we need to further investigate the cases of other countries to draw a general conclusion 
on the effect of the inflation targeting policy.  
 
                                                           
9 We employ the same Markov switching model and estimation method for real GDP growth rate. We collect the 
data from 1997 OECD International Statistical Yearbook CD.  
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Table 1 Chow Break and Forecast Results 
 
Variables F-statistic  P-value 





Table 2 Markov Switching Estimation Results 
 
Parameters 
0 D µ  
1 D µ  
0 1D φ  
1 1D φ  
0 2 D φ  
1 2 D φ  
0 D σ  





















































 * SB denotes Structural Break. 
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